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Harnessing Enforcement Leverage at the Border to Minimize 
Biological Risk from International Live Species Trade 
Michael R. Springborn, Amanda R. Lindsay, and Rebecca S. Epanchin-Niell 
Abstract 
Allocating inspection resources over a diverse set of imports to prevent entry of plant pests and 
pathogens presents a substantial policy design challenge.  We model inspections of live plant imports and 
producer responses to inspections using a “state-dependent” monitoring and enforcement model.  We 
capture exporter abatement response to a set of feasible inspection policies from the regulator. 
Conditional on this behavioral response, we solve the regulator’s problem of selecting the parameters for 
the state-dependent monitoring regime to minimize entry of infested shipments. We account for exporter 
heterogeneity, fixed penalties for noncompliance, imperfect abatement control and imperfect inspections 
at the border.  Overall, we estimate that state-dependent targeting (based on historical interceptions) cuts 
the rate of infested shipments that are accepted by one-fifth, relative to uniformly allocated inspections.   
 
Key Words: state-dependent enforcement, invasive species, international trade, optimal 
inspections, externalities 
JEL Codes: Q58, Q57, Q56 
Highlights  
 We examine optimal inspections of plant imports for non-native pests and pathogens. 
 We model a state-dependent inspection policy accounting for enforcement leverage.   
 We include imperfect abatement control and inspections and exporter heterogeneity. 
 An enforcement leverage policy cuts the rate of accepted infested shipments by 1/5. 
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Harnessing Enforcement Leverage at the Border to Minimize 
Biological Risk from International Live Species Trade 
Michael R. Springborn, Amanda R. Lindsay, and Rebecca S. Epanchin-Niell 
1. Introduction 
The importation of live plants has long been a pathway for the unintentional introduction 
of non-native insect pests and pathogens to the United States (McCullough et al. 2006).  This 
vector has also been expanding at a substantial rate: over the past four decades, the dollar value 
of plants for planting imports to the US has grown at 68% per decade (MacLachlan et al. 2015).  
In order to protect agriculture and natural resources, the US Department of Agriculture’s 
(USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is tasked with minimizing the 
“entry, establishment, and spread of exotic plant pests, diseases, pathogens, and noxious weeds” 
(USDA-APHIS, 2012).  As part of this mission, APHIS inspects shipments of imported plant 
material at ports of entry across the country, and shipments that are found to be infested are 
treated, rejected, or destroyed to prevent pest and pathogen entry.  Resources for these 
inspections have not grown at the same rate as imports, prompting APHIS to reexamine the 
efficiency of the allocation of inspection effort across various sources of imports, differentiated 
by country-commodity pairs.  Historically inspections have been allocated essentially uniformly 
despite heterogeneous risks.  In 2011 APHIS proposed to implement a risk-based inspection 
(RBI) process to target high risk sources with greater inspection effort (USDA-APHIS, 2011).   
                                                 
 This work was funded by USDA-APHIS cooperative agreement 14-8100-1724-CA and by NSF grant 1414374 as 
part of the joint NSF-NIH-USDA Ecology and Evolution of Infectious Diseases program, and by UK Biotechnology 
and Biological Sciences Research Council grant BB/M008894/1.  This work also benefited from support from the 
National Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center (SESYNC), NSF award DBI-1052875. 
Springborn: Department of Environmental Science & Policy, University of California Davis; Lindsay: Department 
of Agricultural & Resource Economics, University of California Davis; Epanchin-Niell: Resources for the Future, 
Washington, DC. 
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While conceptually it is clear that adoption of a risk-based method for targeting 
inspections should provide gains when risks across shipments are non-uniform, several important 
policy design and evaluation questions present a challenge.  If shipments are to be categorized 
into groups based on historical risk, how should thresholds determining group membership be set 
and how should inspection effort differ between groups?  How should the policy be set to ensure 
that available inspection resources are not overburdened?  What monitoring structure generates 
the greatest incentive for offshore producers to engage in phytosanitary abatement efforts?   
Finally, given that changing inspection policy is costly, what level of improvement in reducing 
pest and pathogen entry should be expected from a shift to RBI?  In this manuscript we develop 
an integrated model of offshore producer (exporter) behavior and targeted border inspections 
calibrated to the data on live plant imports into the US in order to provide insight into the 
questions above.   
We model inspections of live plant imports and producer responses to inspections using a 
“state-dependent” monitoring and enforcement model that was first applied to pollution control 
problems by Harrington (1988). In Harrington’s original model homogeneous firms make the 
decision to “comply” or “violate” an emissions standard and the regulator sets a policy in order 
to achieve a predetermined target compliance rate with the fewest number of inspections. Firms 
are divided into two groups, each assigned with an inspection frequency and fine for 
noncompliance, according to an assumed set of transition rules and the outcome of the most 
recent inspection. Generally in state-dependent regulatory schemes, entities with worse 
compliance records are subject to some combination of more intense inspection, greater penalties 
for violations, or tougher standards (Cohen, 1998).  
Most state-dependent enforcement models use the group transition policy detailed by 
Harrington (1988) (e.g. Harford and Harrington, 1991; Harford, 1991; Raymond, 1999). A firm 
stays in or is moved into the low-compliance group when an inspection reveals noncompliance. 
If an inspection reveals compliance, the firm stays in or moves into the high-compliance group 
with some assumed probability. In contrast to Harrington’s (1988) assumed transition rule, 
Friesen (2003) mathematically derives the optimal transition policy for moving firms between a 
targeted and a non-targeted group. The “optimal targeting” policy moves firms into the targeted 
group at random and out of the targeted group with positive probability if an inspection reveals 
firm compliance.  Optimal targeting out-performs the policy from Harrington (1988) unless the 
desired compliance rate is sufficiently high. 
A direct benefit of a state-dependent or targeted inspection policy is that inspection-
driven incentives for cleaner activity are focused on the dirtiest entities.  An additional indirect 
Resources for the Future Springborn, Lindsay, and Epanchin-Niell 
3 
abatement incentive is generated from the threat of moving into the low-compliance group or the 
prospect of escaping into the high-compliance group; this is known in the literature as 
“enforcement leverage” (Harrington 1988).   Harrington shows abatement is greatest when the 
fine for the group with high compliance rates is set to the minimum and the fine for the group 
with low compliance rates is set to the maximum. If the expected cost of a violation is too low, 
however, firms in the high-compliance group may have a dampened abatement incentive. 
Raymond (1999) explores how heterogeneous compliance costs may impact the effectiveness of 
the state-dependent monitoring and enforcement policy, noting that if an industry has a large 
proportion of firms with low compliance costs, it is optimal to set both groups’ fines to the 
maximum. 
Harrington’s 1988 model yields a counterintuitive result: it is optimal to assign different 
inspection intensities to firms with identical marginal abatement costs. Harford and Harrington 
(1991) show that a static policy, a policy where all firms face the same inspection probability, is 
superior to state-dependent policy only when the standard and monitoring policy can be set 
simultaneously.  Allowing for inspection measurement error, Harford (1991) finds evidence that 
state-dependent enforcement is still preferred over static enforcement once a standard has been 
selected. A socially optimal state-dependent mechanism treats identical firms differently because 
the firms’ increased abatement costs are less than the reduction in the regulator’s monitoring 
costs (Harford, 1991).  
None of the aforementioned models include a regulatory budget constraint despite the 
fact that a targeted inspection policy is needed precisely because regulatory enforcement budgets 
are limited. To our knowledge, Liu and Neilson (2013) were the first to incorporate a fixed 
inspection capacity constraint in their state-dependent enforcement and monitoring model. They 
define the feasible policy set using inspection probabilities and the proportion of otherwise 
identical firms assigned to each of the two groups. In order ensure the chosen policy does not 
over-burden or under-utilize inspection capacity, Liu and Neilson develop new group transition 
rules. Firms with the highest level of noncompliance are moved into or stay in the targeted group 
according to a rank order tournament between inspected firms. Their model allows the regulator 
to minimize the aggregate level of pollution, more accurately capturing the objective of the 
regulatory agency. However, the rank order tournament requires each firm to consider the best 
response functions of all other firms, a particularly unrealistic assumption in our application, 
which considers a large number of globally distributed, heterogeneous exporters.  In this paper 
we extend the framework of Liu and Neilson to allow for exporters that do not know the 
response functions of the other exporters being considered for inspection.  Here, an exporter 
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consists of offshore producers within a unique origin-commodity combination, where the origin 
is given by country and commodities are defined by plant genus.   
Previously published work on border inspections for invasive species management has 
considered policies that are (1) sensitive to inspection history, (2) involve high and low risk 
groups, (3) account for firm behavioral response, (4) allow for firm heterogeneity, and (5) set 
policy parameters through optimization.  However no previous paper unifies all of these 
components.  Robinson et al. (2011) consider a state-based inspection model of trade pathways 
to prevent invasive species introduction in which sources of trade are allocated to high and low 
risk groups that differ in their inspection frequency. In contrast to our application, the risk 
threshold to determine group membership and inspection frequencies are selected without 
guidance from an outcome based objective – inspections of the high risk group are set arbitrarily 
to 100% and the low risk group is inspected at a frequency to verify continued low risk group 
membership. The approach does not account for exporter behavioral response resulting from 
enforcement leverage or variation in inspection frequency. They nonetheless find gains relative 
to uniform sampling.  Springborn et al. (2010) illustrate a heuristic learning model in which 
inspections are generally allocated to the riskiest imports except where exploratory rules of 
thumb are used to redirect a portion of inspections to learn about risks considered low but with 
uncertainty.  Springborn (2014) extends this model in a multi-armed bandit framework to inform 
optimal exploration, i.e. instances in which the value of information gleaned from inspecting 
imports with lower expected risk but high uncertainty is sufficient to deviate from a strict 
prioritization of imports by highest expected risk.  Neither of these latter two papers considers 
firm behavioral response.  
Ameden et al. (2007) develop a theoretical model of firm response to border enforcement 
in order to understand the relationship between due-care technology and probability of detection. 
In their four-stage model, heterogeneous exporters first choose the number of shipments and 
treatment effort, then regulators conduct inspections and choose enforcement actions. While 
Ameden et al. (2007) restrict their attention to uniform inspections, similar to our approach they 
solve their model using nested optimization and backward induction. Building on this theoretical 
model of firm behavior, Ameden et al. (2009) develop an agent-based model (ABM) of border 
enforcement incorporating a spatially explicit damage function as well as an array of exogenous 
and endogenous port-specific variables. Regulators can choose a port-specific level of inspection 
and can increase inspection effort for firms with historically high inspection violations. However, 
this prior violation record is set to zero at the beginning of each year. 
Resources for the Future Springborn, Lindsay, and Epanchin-Niell 
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We extend and apply a state-dependent monitoring and enforcement modeling approach 
to APHIS’ trade inspections RBI problem in which APHIS seeks to minimize the number of 
infested shipments that enter the US, given a capacity constraint that limits the number of 
shipments that can be inspected. The first model component captures exporter abatement 
response to a set of feasible inspection policies. Conditional on this behavioral response, the 
second model component captures the regulator’s problem of selecting the parameters for the 
state-dependent monitoring regime. In particular, the model is used to determine (1) the 
compliance threshold for distinguishing groups and (2) group inspection frequencies.  Given 
inspection capacity constraints, our structure captures a key tradeoff: increasing inspection 
frequency in the high risk group (similar to Harrington’s low-compliance group) must be 
accompanied by either decreasing inspection frequency in the low risk group (high-compliance 
group) or reducing the number of entities in the high risk group.  Our model accounts for 
exporter heterogeneity, fixed penalties for noncompliance (interceptions), imperfect abatement 
(infestation control) by exporters, and imperfect inspections at the border. We incorporate a fixed 
inspection budget by defining group assignment based on historic exporter compliance, allowing 
us to relax the assumptions proposed by Liu and Neilson. We characterize policy design 
tradeoffs, estimate numerical inputs to the model, and assess the expected level of reduced pest 
and pathogen entry that such a risk-based approach might achieve.    
We estimate that a state-dependent monitoring and enforcement policy can reduce the 
expected number of infested shipments that enter into the US by one-fifth.  The optimal policy 
entails inspecting all shipments from exporters with poor historic compliance records and less 
than 30% of shipments from exporters with good historic compliance records.  We develop and 
show results for a model with homogenous exporters—to illustrate outcomes in a simple 
framework—and with heterogeneous exporters to increase realism.  We find that the 
heterogeneous exporter extension is essential for arriving at an optimal compliance threshold 
governing group designation that is plausible. 
2. Model 
We begin with an overview of the model components, and then characterize the 
exporters’ optimal response to inspection regimes which subsequently informs the regulator’s 
optimal policy for minimizing accepted infested shipments.  
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2.1 Overview of Model Components 
Each of the n exporters (offshore producers) represents a unique country-commodity 
pairing, where commodities are defined by plant genus.  Differential treatment of exporters is 
governed by their historical interception rate, a, as determined by the results from inspection of 
their shipments.  A shipment is considered intercepted if it is identified as infested during an 
inspection.1  The regulator’s policy design challenge is determining how to allocate exporters 
into groups, indexed by g, that differ in inspection frequency. For simplicity we consider two 
groups, a medium frequency inspection group (g = M) and high frequency inspection group (g = 
H).2  
We structure the problem using a two-stage game theoretic framework.  In the first stage, 
the regulator announces an interception rate cutoff, [0,1]z , which determines whether an 
exporter will fall into the medium inspection rate group (g = M if a < z) or the high group (g = H 
if a > z).  The regulator also announces each group’s inspection rate,g, defined as the expected 
proportion of an exporter’s shipments targeted for inspection.  Group H is undesirable for 
exporters given its higher expected inspection rate: H > M.  The regulator’s inspection policy 
vector is defined as Ω = (M, H, z) and is announced publicly to exporters.  Given the regulator’s 
expectations over the exporters’ cost-minimizing response to the policy vector, the regulator 
selects a policy to minimize expected accepted infested shipments conditional on the available 
inspections budget, B.  The constrained minimization problem driving this cost-effective policy 
design challenge is specified in detail after we first describe the exporters’ problem.   
2.2 Exporter Policy Response 
Exporters choose an infestation abatement effort level on the unit interval, , after 
the inspection policy Ω is announced. The exporter’s shipment rate is given by s (shipments per 
period), and exporters face convex costs of abatement effort given by 2) / (1 )( wc e e   for each 
shipment.  Their shipment infestation rate (expected proportion of shipments infested) is 
                                                 
1 Rather than “infested”, APHIS uses the broader terminology of “actionable”. 
2 The existing approach of APHIS already includes the designation of a low risk group.  Country-commodity pairs 
that are determined to ‘pose an extremely low risk’ are placed into a Propagative Monitoring and Release Program 
(PMRP).  APHIS periodically inspects exporters in this group, but does not inspect all shipments.  This monitoring 
is used to determine if PMRP status can be maintained.  Because of this special inspection procedure, we set aside 
PMRP shipments from our data and modeling approach. 
[0,1]e
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decreasing linearly in e according to 0 1( ) )(e e   , where o is the base rate of infestation 
when e = 0.     
To evaluate the benefit of additional abatement effort, exporters form expectations over 
shipment interceptions and consider the implications of crossing the interception rate cutoff, z, 
which determines group membership and associated inspection frequency, ρg.  Expectations on 
group membership depend on expectations for the updated historical interception rate, a’.  We 
assume that the dynamics of a’ are a function of the historical interception rate (a), the number of 
shipments inspected (I), and the number found to be infested (k):  
  ,'( ), I k a
I
ka
I
Ia
I

 
          ,   (1) 
where  is a parameter determining the relative weight given to the interception rate 
observed historically (a) and currently (k/I).  This functional form is motivated by a streamlined 
Bayesian approach detailed in Appendix A.  Its properties are such that as the value of ε 
increases, the “memory” of historical interception rate is stronger, and as ε becomes very large 
(ε/( ε +I) approaches one), current outcomes have little effect on the measure.  In addition, 
Equation (1) assigns more weight to the most recently observed interception rate (k/I) when it is 
based on a larger number of observations (I).  When there are no new inspections the 
interception rate is unchanged.    
For a given exporter we assume that the number of inspections, I, is a binomial random 
variable, conditional on the shipment rate and the inspection frequency, s and ρg. The number of 
infested shipments identified, k, is a binomial random variable, conditional on I and the 
underlying infestation rate, ߠ.  We also account for the fact that inspections are imperfect.  The 
detection rate, d, is the proportion of inspections of infested shipments that result in successful 
interceptions.  Inspections can be imperfect due either to drawing a noninfested sample from an 
infested shipment or failing to detect infestation of the sample when inspecting it.3  We 
incorporate imperfect inspections as a deflator on the infestation rate in the process governing 
interceptions:	݀ ∗ ߠ.  Thus the likelihood of an observation (I,k) is the product of two binomial 
densities: 
                                                 
3 Thus, d	is	the	product	of	two	terms,	both	on	the	unit	interval:	(1)	the	sample	infestation	confidence,	which	is	
the	probability	that	a	particular	sample	inspected	from	an	infested	shipment	is	itself	infested,	and	(2)	the	
efficiency	rate,	which	is	the	probability	that	an	infestation	in	an	examined	sample	is	detected. 
0 
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   (2) 
The density function for state transitions,  |ˆ 'a a , i.e. the probability of transitioning to 
 ' ,' ,ˆ a aa I k  from a, is given by    ˆ '
,
ˆ ' ( ') P ,| r
I s k I
aa a a I k
 
  1 .  Here ˆ ' ( ')a a1  is an indicator 
function equal to one whenever ˆ'a a  .   
Transitions are bounded from below by a = 0 and from above by a = aban, the interception 
rate at which an exporter is simply banned from shipping.  The probability of being in group M 
next period—i.e. the probability that a’ is less than z—is given by the cumulative density 
function of a’ evaluated at the policy interception rate cutoff z:  |'a z a  .  For simplicity of 
notation, let   ||' z aa z a   .  Membership in group H has probability | |bana a z a  .  Finally, 
the likelihood of being banned in the next period is |1 bana a .  We assume that if an exporter is 
currently banned, there is a fixed probability of recovery in the next period, at which point their 
historical interception rate is reset to just below the banishment threshold at 0.95aban.   
In each period, the exporter chooses an abatement effort level e in order to minimize the 
expected value of long-run discounted losses. Losses in the current period equal the sum of 
abatement and inspection costs across the exporter’s shipments: 
  |( | ,   
[ ( ) ( ( ))],  if
                            if .
 ) , 
g
g a
ban ban
bans c e edL
a
a
a
s
e
L a
        

   (3) 
where  is the marginal cost of an inspection (e.g. cost of delay),  is the cost per intercepted 
shipment (e.g. treatment, rejection or destruction), and Lban is the per-shipment loss when an 
exporter is banned. The subscript on indicates that inspection frequency depends on whether 
the current historical interception rate, a, places the exporter in group g = M or H. The Bellman 
equation for the exporter’s loss minimization problem given the policy vector Ω = (M, H, z) is:  
   
|
|
| | | |
( |
( | ) min ( ') ( ') ( )
)
1 '
ban ban
g a
g a
a M a a z a H a
e
nz a ba
L e
V a
a a E aEV EV V



     
        
,   (4) 
|g a
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where β is a discount factor and E is the expectations operator. Using value function iteration 
(Judd, 1998) we solve the exporter problem above for the optimal response to any given 
inspection policy announcement, e*(a|Ω). 
Exporter heterogeneity is represented by dividing our large pool of exporters into J = 4 
exporter types that differ based on combinations of shipment frequencies, sj, and abatement 
costs, as characterized by the cost parameter wj.  These type-specific parameters are detailed 
further in our numerical application description below.  Exporters of the same type may also 
differ in their historical interception rate, a, since the inspection and interception processes are 
stochastic.  
2.3 Regulator Policy Selection 
The regulator chooses the policy vector Ω = (M, H, z) to minimize the expected number 
of accepted infested shipments, E(X| Ω), conditional on an inspection budget, B.   The budget 
reflects the number of shipments that can be inspected in each period (e.g. month). The number 
of shipments actually inspected in group g per exporter of type j is given by Ig,j.  A priori, in 
expectation, the inspection budget constraint takes the form  
  ,,
( )g j
g g j g g
j
g j g
E I
B
s
S S              ,   (5) 
where S is the total number of shipments across all exporters, λg is the share of shipments in 
group g, and ,g j is the proportion of shipments in group g from exporter type j. Because we are 
considering just two groups, let λH = λ and λM = 1 – λ.4 
A challenge is created by the fact that exporters respond to the vector Ω = (M, H, z) 
while the feasible set of policy vectors determined from the budget constraint features λ rather 
than z: Ωλ = (M, H, λ).  It would be essentially meaningless to announce Ωλ to exporters since 
λ—the share of exporters in the high group—conveys only a very noisy idea of the threshold 
level of an exporter’s historical interception rate that will determine group membership.   
Conversely, a priori, it is unknown whether any given vector Ω will be both feasible and not 
leave inspection resources unallocated.   Thus we require a bridge between the regulator’s need 
                                                 
4 While technically it is feasible for there to be a third share of exports that fall into the banned region, we use the 
simple notation for shares specified here since in equilibrium the threat of banning at aban provides sufficient 
incentive for there to be no exports above this threshold.   
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to plan in terms of λ and the exporters’ need to plan with respect to z.  We address this problem 
as follows.  For each vector Ωλ = (M, H, λ) that is just binding with respect to the budget 
constraint, we solve the exporter’s problem across a range of z and then identify the particular 
level of this cutoff, zλ, that induces λ, thus allowing the regulator to announce Ω = (M, H, zλ).   
Ensuring that the share of group H shipments indeed matches λ requires calculation of the 
stationary distribution of incoming shipments by interception rate conditional on the exporters’ 
optimal response,  e*(a|Ω).  This stationary distribution is represented by the probability mass 
function fs(a).  It is constructed in two steps: first we identify the distribution of interception rates 
where exporters are the unit of observation, fe(a), and then transform to express the distribution 
by shipment, fs(a).  We start by identifying π(a’|a) conditional on the exporter response, e*.  Here 
π(a’|a) takes the form of a Markov transition matrix, since inspection observations result in 
discrete shifts in a.  The unit of observation underlying π is the exporter.  The stationary 
distribution of a Markov transition matrix—loosely speaking, the long-run probability of any 
given state—is given by the left eigenvector with corresponding eigenvalue of one, by the 
fundamental theorem of Markov chains (Diaconis, 2009).  The appropriate eigenvector provides 
fs(a|j) for each exporter type j.  Accounting for differences in shipping levels between types and 
the shares of each type, we identify the aggregate distribution, fs(a).  The cumulative mass 
function Fs(a) can then be identified.  Finally we identify the particular cutoff zλ such that the 
share of shipments in H matches the intended share, 1-Fs(a|zλ) = λ. 
For a shipment—conditional on the regulator’s policy, the exporter’s type and given the 
historical interception rate—the expected accepted infested shipment rate is:    
	    
Prop. of infested Prop. of shipments shipments inspected not inspected but
*
 not detec
|
ted
|( | , ) 1 (1 ) ( | , )[ ]g a g ax a j ad e j       .		 (6)	
The regulator calculates the expected number of accepted infested shipments according to 
  ( | ) ( | , ) ( | )
j a s
E X x a j f a j     .  (7) 
The regulator’s problem can be summarized as  
	
min ( | )
s.t.  .
g g g
E X
B S  
 
  		 (8)	
If information on how the present value of expected damages of likely invaders from different 
exporters were broadly available, it would be ideal to account for that heterogeneity.  However, 
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since such information is not available, the objective above implicitly treats each infested 
shipment equally.  
2.4 Numerical Parameterization 
In Table 1 we list and describe parameters and variables of the model.  For each 
parameter we also specify the value chosen and the source of the value.  We use APHIS data on 
imports of live plants and shipment dispositions (i.e., inspection outcomes) from fiscal year 2012 
to estimate and calibrate parameters.  We focus on 2012 rather than 2013 or 2014 because over 
those latter two years APHIS’ inspection strategy has been in transition, namely in the protocol 
determining the size and selection of samples from a shipment selected for inspection.   
Observations come from APHIS’ Agriculture Quarantine Activity System (AQAS) PPQ 280/264 
database.  Most of the management parameters were selected based on summary statistics from 
these data.  Several parameters were also selected based on communications with APHIS staff.  
Accounting for exporter response is a challenge given that an exporter’s “abatement cost 
function” is not observable.  We calibrate the model to match 2012 outcomes to construct as 
realistic a representation of exporter response as possible. Specifically, the cost parameters wj are 
chosen such that the interception rate predicted by our model matches the observed rate from 
2012. In the calibration exercise we assume the regulator inspects all shipments with equal 
probability, essentially the approach in place in 2012.   
We apply our model both with and without consideration of exporter heterogeneity in 
shipping rate and abatement cost.  We incorporate exporter heterogeneity by dividing our pool of 
1,545 exporters into four types.  Each of the four exporter types is initially characterized by 
empirical estimates of interception rate and shipment frequency (detailed in Appendix B).  We 
then calibrate the model (as described above) to identify a unique abatement cost function 
parameter value, wj, for each of the four exporter types.   These four exporter types represent 
pairings of high or low abatement cost with a high or low shipping rate.  The degree to which 
inspection resources will be constrained under RBI is unknown.  We consider a case in which 
resources are available to inspect 69% of shipments. 
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Table 1.  Descriptions, values, and sources for model parameters and variables. 
Parameter  Description  Value 
Regulator parameters and variables   
B  Number of shipments inspected per period under uniform and RBI 
sampling inspection policies:  
        B=[(total shipments 2012)* ρg]/12 
3206a,b
a  Exporter observed interception rate Determined by 
inspections 
aban  Interception rate ban level 0.20b 
Pr(recovery)  Per period probability that an exporter’s shipments will be 
permitted again after an exporter has been banned 
0.05b 
ρu  Proportion shipments inspected under uniform sampling strategy 
(assumed) for comparison with RBI 
0.69 
ρg  Proportion of shipments in group g inspected per period under RBI 
policy 
Regulator optimal 
choice 
λg  Proportion of exports in group g under RBI policy λ= λH = 1‐ λM  Regulator optimal 
choice 
zλ  Interception rate cutoff determining group membership that 
induces the targeted share of exporters in the high group, λ  
Regulator 
announcement  
efficiency rate  Percentage of examined infested samples identified as infested  0.40b 
sample infestation 
confidence 
Conditional on shipment infestation, the probability that the 
sample chosen for inspection is infested 
0.80b (pre‐RBSd) 
0.95b (RBSd) 
D  Detection rate, i.e. percentage of infested shipments that are 
intercepted during inspection.  d = (efficiency rate)*(sample 
infestation confidence) 
0.32b (pre‐RBSd)
0.38b (RBSd) 
Exporter parameters and variables   
o  Base rate of shipment infestation given no abatement effort 0.80b 
.  Average value of shipment $5000 
  Marginal cost of inspection (shipment delay) to the exporter.  As a 
proportion of the total value of the shipment   
0.01b 
  Expected cost to exporter per intercepted shipment, associated 
with treatment, destruction or rejection of intercepted 
shipments.  As a proportion of the total value of shipment. 
0.452a,b
E  Abatement effort. Endogenously selected by each exporter type  Exporter optimal 
choice 
Homogenous exporter model parameters   
N  Total number of exporters 1,545 
S  Average shipment rate per period (month) 3a 
w    Phytosanitary effort cost function parameter 0.89c 
Heterogeneous exporter model parameters   
n1, n2, n3, n4  Total number of exporters  for each exporter type [603,202,669,71]a
s1, s2, s3, s4  Average shipment rate per period (month) for each exporter type  [2,7,1,19]a
w1, w2, w3, w4  Phytosanitary effort cost function parameter for each exporter 
type 
[1.7x10‐4,5x10‐6, 
8.26, 46.19]c 
Other parameters     
Ε  Parameter of interception rate updating function determining 
persistency of past observations   
11/12 
  Discount factor  1/1.03
a Calculated from 2012 data, the benchmark year. b Established in personal communications with APHIS. 
c Calibrated to ensure uniform inspection model output matches 2012 data. d RBS (risk‐based sampling) is an 
amended (post 2012) APHIS protocol for rigorously sampling units within shipments.  
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3. Results 
We first present results for the exporter’s optimal abatement response as a function of the 
exporter’s historical interception rate, a.  Figure 1 illustrates the exporter’s value function and 
optimal abatement effort function under the homogeneous exporter model for both the uniform 
inspection policy and a particular RBI policy, specifically the optimal RBI policy, discussed 
further below. The value function—the minimized present value of expected losses—is 
increasing in a.   Under both policies, the value function is most sensitive to changes in the 
historical interception rate near the ban threshold (a = 0.2).  Under the RBI policy, the value 
function is also sensitive to changes in the historical interception rate near the threshold 
separating the high and medium group (zλ).   
Figure 1. Value function (left) and policy function (right) solutions for homogenous exporter 
model under the uniform policy and optimal RBI policy, [ρM, ρH, zλ, λ] = [0.28, 1.00, 0.012, 0.57]. 
 
The policy function comparison in Figure 1 demonstrates how state-dependent 
monitoring and enforcement policies change exporter incentives.  Recall that given a shift from 
the uniform to RBI policy, exporters in the high group are inspected more intensively and those 
in the low group less intensively.  However, despite exporters to the left of the threshold being 
inspected less intensively under RBI, the policy function solution shows that their optimal 
abatement response still increases, reflecting the incentive to avoid being placed into the high 
inspection group.  Similarly, we observe a dramatic jump in optimal effort just above the 
interception rate cutoff that is not observed under the uniform inspection policy. When exporters 
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have historical interception rates that are above but close to the interception rate cutoff, increased 
abatement effort may help return exporters to group M. These two features of exporter response 
under RBI illustrate ‘enforcement leverage’.  A combination of enforcement leverage and the 
direct effect of higher inspection frequency in group H leads to higher abatement under RBI 
until, as a continues to increase, the threat of exceeding the banning cutoff (a = 0.20) dominates, 
leading to similar peak effort under both policies.  Given that abatement effort increases due to 
the shift from uniform inspections to RBI for both groups (except when roughly equal at extreme 
levels of a), exporters’ total abatement costs also go up.  However, the value function shows that 
on balance exporters are better off (in expectation) given a shift to RBI policy when they are 
under or near the threshold due to reduced costs from the inspection process. 
When the model is extended to include exporter heterogeneity, each exporter type has a 
unique value and policy function. The qualitative policy function results from the homogeneous 
model hold for the heterogeneous model, although exporter types with particularly low 
abatement costs have high abatement effort even before the policy change, which leaves only a 
small margin for improvement.   
An exporter’s optimally selected abatement effort results in a particular rate of expected 
shipment infestation. Infestations occur in some shipments, which have a positive probability of 
interception if they are inspected.  Given randomness in shipment infestation and inspections—
as well as variation in abatement cost and shipment rates when accounting for exporter 
heterogeneity—a distribution of interception rates arises.  In Figure 2 we plot the resulting 
stationary distributions of interception rates by shipment for the uniform inspection and optimal 
RBI policies from the homogeneous exporter model.  While the uniform policy leads to a fairly 
smooth distribution, the optimal RBI policy generates a bimodal distribution with peaks 
occurring to the left and right of the interception rate cutoff that separates the medium and high 
groups.  This bimodality is not surprising given that abatement effort is high near the threshold 
zλ, which serves to drive infestation rates down in order escape group H.  
Table 2 displays the average interception rates for all cases (policies, groups and types).  
It also provides the percentage of shipments that fall into groups M and H in equilibrium—i.e. 
the shipment shares the above and below the vertical line at zλ in Figure 2.  Since under the 
uniform policy there is no difference in treatment among groups, group designation in this 
context simply reflects how exporters are distributed relative to zλ from the RBI policy.  
Confirming intuition from Figure 2, we find that the share of shipments with interception rates 
greater than zλ declines by about one-third under optimal RBI.  The average interception rate for 
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shipments in group M increases but this is due to the influx of exporters improving from group H 
to group M under RBI.  
Figure 2.  Stationary distribution of historical interception rates by shipment, for the 
homogeneous exporter model. Graphs display equilibrium probability mass of historical 
interception rates, Pr(a), for a uniform inspection policy (top), [ρM, ρH] = [0.69, 0.69], and the 
optimal RBI policy (bottom), [ρM, ρH, zλ, λ] = [0.28, 1.00, 0.012, 0.57].  The vertical dotted line 
depicts the interception rate cutoff, zλ. 
 
In the heterogeneous exporter model each exporter type has a unique stationary 
distribution of historical interception rates. The two low abatement cost exporter types (1 and 2) 
display qualitative differences similar to those observed in the homogeneous exporter model. In 
particular, under the optimal RBI policy the mass of shipments below the interception rate cutoff 
increases substantially, while above the interception rate cutoff the average interception rate 
decreases. In both the uniform inspection policy and optimal RBI policy, shipments from high 
abatement cost exporter types (3 and 4) lie entirely above the interception rate cutoff.  Thus, the 
observed reduction in historical interception rates for high abatement cost types is due entirely to 
greater inspection frequency under RBI, rather than ‘enforcement leverage’. 
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Table 2. Average equilibrium interception rate and equilibrium percentage of shipments in 
groups. 
Homogeneous exporter model 
Uniform 
inspection 
policy 
Average 
interception 
rate 
Group M  3.22% 
Group H  3.18% 
All  3.18% 
% shipments in group H  87.4% 
           
Optimal 
RBI policy 
Average 
interception 
rate 
Group M  1.27% 
Group H  3.69% 
All  2.65% 
% of shipments in group 
H  57.0% 
Exporter type 
Heterogeneous exporter model  1  2  3  4  All types 
Uniform 
inspection 
policy 
Average 
interception 
rate 
Group M  0.20%  0.066%  ‐  ‐    
Group H  0.20%  0.066%  5.84%  6.84% 
All  0.20%  0.066%  5.84%  6.84%  2.90% 
% of shipments in group 
H  38.9%  9.8%  100.0%  100.0%  60.8% 
                       
Optimal 
RBI policy 
Average 
interception 
rate 
Group M  0.081%  0.027%  ‐  ‐ 
Group H  0.22%  0.056%  7.70%  9.71% 
All  0.11%  0.028%  7.70%  9.71%  3.97% 
% of shipments in group 
H  22.1%  3.7%  100.0%  100.0%  49.8% 
Combining results for the exporters’ policy function and the resulting likelihood of 
different interception rate states, we calculate the expected accepted infested shipment (EAIS) 
rate for a broad set of feasible policies.  This is the key statistic that the regulator seeks to 
minimize.  Note that while interception rates (discussed above) are an observable statistic, in 
contrast the EAIS is determined by infested shipments, which are estimated rather than directly 
observed.    
Under the homogenous model we find that the optimal RBI policy that minimizes EAIS 
is Ωλ = (M, H, λ) = (0.28, 1.00, 0.57). The corresponding equilibrium interception rate cutoff to 
be announced by the regulator is given by zλ = 1.2%.  To put this threshold value in context we 
examined the pool of exporters in our dataset and determined that the targeted level of exports in 
the high group (λ=57%) is achieved using a cutoff of zλ=0.16%.  However, this cutoff calculation 
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ignores the behavioral response we expect from the implementation of the RBI policy: we have 
shown that the RBI policy increases optimal abatement and shifts the distribution of expected 
historical interception rates down towards zero.  Thus in our applied setting we would expect that 
the requisite cutoff would be substantially lower than zλ=0.16%.  This implies that the cutoff 
identified under the simple homogenous model is not appropriate for our setting.   
When we increase realism via the heterogeneous exporter model, we find that the 
interception rate cutoff is in the expected range, zλ=0.00016%.  While the equilibrium cutoff is 
quite different, we find that the optimal policy vector is the same as in the homogeneous model, 
Ωλ = (M, H, λ) = (0.28, 1.00, 0.57). We present the full set of results for the EAIS in Figure 3 
for the heterogeneous exporter model (for the analogous figure for homogeneous exporters see 
Appendix C).  The set of feasible policy vectors, Ωλ = (M, H, λ), underlying the results in 
Figure 3 is depicted in the left panel of Figure 4.  In the right panel of Figure 4 we present the 
equilibrium threshold, zλ, corresponding to each of the policies considered.   
The left-most column of cells in Figures 3 and 4 reflects the outcome under uniform 
inspections (M = H = 0.69) which results in an EAIS rate of 8.28%.   The optimal policy 
minimizes this rate at 6.66% by inspecting ρH = 100% of shipments in the high group, which 
contains a little over half of all shipments (λ = 57%).  Inspections of the remaining 43% of 
shipments that fall in the medium risk group are much less intense, with ρM = 28.2% of 
shipments inspected.   The general pattern in Figure 3 is quite regular with outcomes generally 
improving as λ and ρH increase.  However it is not optimal to set λ at its maximum feasible value 
(given ρH = 100%), as this would reduce ρM even further.  Overall, relative to uniform 
inspections, we find that increasing inspection frequency in the high group and decreasing 
inspection frequency in the medium group—both by roughly 50%—cuts the EAIS rate by one-
fifth.  This optimal strategy involves targeting the 57% of shipments from exporters with the 
highest interception rates with approximately 82% of the inspection budget.5 
All cases that fall above the gray line in Figure 3 are feasible but do not completely 
exhaust the inspection budget.  For these cases it was not numerically feasible to identify a level 
of zλ such that the equilibrium share of shipments in group H was equal to λ within a tolerance of 
+/- 0.5% as was achieved in other cases (formally, |[1-Fs(a|z)] - λ |< 0.005).  For cases above the 
grey line, the share of exports in group H changes with discrete jumps that are too large to 
                                                 
5 The share of inspections allocated to group H is given by  ( )/ 1H H M     . 
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closely exhaust but not exceed the inspections budget.  For these cases—which include the 
policy vector that performed best—we selected the level of zλ that came closest to exhausting 
inspections without exceeding the budget.   
Figure 3. Expected accepted infested shipment (EAIS) rate across all shipments under the 
heterogeneous model. Numbers in two individual cells indicate values for uniform inspection 
policy (southwest corner) and the optimal policy (northeast region).  Each colored cell 
corresponds to a feasible policy vector characterized in Figure 4. The left column of cells 
represents the uniform policy (ρM = ρH). Feasible policies (non-white cells) that fall above the 
gray line do not completely exhaust the inspection budget. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The left image illustrates the set of feasible policy vectors, Ωλ = (M, H, λ), considered 
by the regulator. The right image illustrates each policy’s corresponding interception rate cutoff 
zλ. Numbers in two individual cells indicate values for uniform inspection policy (southwest 
corner) and the optimal policy (northeast region) where zλ = 1.6x10-6.  The left column of cells 
represents the uniform policy (ρM = ρH).   In both images, white cells represent policies that 
exceed the budget constraint. Feasible policies (non-white cells) that fall above the gray line do 
not completely exhaust the inspection budget.   
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4. Conclusion 
In this manuscript we have shown how the state-dependent, enforcement leverage model 
can be adapted to the problem of inspecting international trade for biological risk.  Our 
application addresses the importation of live plants which has been the strongest pathway for the 
unintentional introduction of non-native insect pests and pathogens to the US (Liebhold et al. 
2012).  A key constraint in this setting is the reality of limited inspection capacity, as previously 
explored by Liu and Neilson (2013).  This setting also generated novel challenges.  Each 
potential target for inspection (exporter) presents the regulator with multiple opportunities to 
inspect each period (multiple shipments) as opposed to inspection of a single fixed facility.  
Simply announcing the share of targets that will lie in the most intensely inspected group—as is 
typical in the standard fixed-polluter setting (e.g. Liu and Neilson, 2013)—will not work in a 
setting like ours with such diversity and scale that inspected entities are unable to generate 
expectations about where they stand relative to others.  We overcome this challenge with a 
structure in which the regulator announces a threshold for the exporter’s cumulative compliance 
metric (historic interception rate) that it expects to induce the desired share of shipments in each 
group.   
Many papers in the state-dependent enforcement literature incorporate group-specific 
penalties and inspection intensities. The models that additionally assume homogeneous firms 
find that the penalty for the low violation group should be set to a minimum and inspection 
intensity in the high violation group should be close to unity (e.g. Harrington, 1988; Harrington 
and Harford, 1991; Friesen, 2003).  Similarly, we find that under a homogeneous exporter 
model, it is optimal to set inspection effort to its maximum for the high interception group—a 
result that continues to hold under heterogeneous exporters.  The existing literature suggests that 
a non-zero penalty for the low violation group is preferred once measurement error is introduced 
(Harford 1991) or there is firm heterogeneity with a large proportion of low compliance cost 
firms (Raymond 1999)—two features also present in our setting. Both high and low inspection 
groups face the same fixed costs of violation (interception). Differences in group-specific 
expected cost of noncompliance is generated completely by inspection intensities, as in Liu and 
Neilson.  
The optimal strategy in our setting involves inspecting with certainty the 57% of 
shipments from exporters with the highest interception rates, using approximately 82% of the 
inspection budget.  We estimate that relative to uniform inspections—which target 69% of 
shipments from each exporter—the optimal RBI policy cuts the EAIS rate by one-fifth by 
increasing inspection frequency in the high group and decreasing inspection frequency in the 
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medium group—both by roughly 50%.  This improvement is substantial in light of the fact that 
this EAIS rate under a uniform inspection policy (8.3%) is already quite low in absolute terms—
Harrington (1988) and Friesen (2003) show that gains from state-dependent enforcement and 
monitoring diminish as the targeted compliance rate increases—i.e. as the baseline violation rate 
becomes small.  Friesen (2003) also notes that as a firm’s compliance cost increases relative to 
the maximum fine, higher inspection frequency is required but may not be sufficient, to induce 
compliance. Along these lines, in our results, under the optimal policy we find that high 
abatement cost exporters (types 3 and 4) increase abatement effort but never sufficiently to 
escape the high violation group.  
In our model, an exporter comprises all offshore producers within a unique origin-
commodity combination, where the origin is given by country and where commodities are 
defined by plant genus.  This differs from the existing literature which focuses on individual 
firms.  We focus on country-genus combinations because this is the scale at which the US 
currently evaluates and responds to non-native species risk.  This approach acknowledges that 
individual private offshore producers with poor inspection histories can simply dissolve and 
reorganize under a new name (a strategy not feasible at the country-genus level).  Furthermore, 
National Plant Protection Organizations in exporting countries serve to coordinate producer 
practices and certify that exports meet phytosanitary requirements.   
While our results regarding optimal inspection intensities and shares of exports allocated 
to the two groups were the same under the homogeneous and heterogeneous exporter model, 
identification of the appropriate interception rate cutoff delineating the groups changed 
substantially.  While it could be the case that this threshold would change further as more fine 
scaled heterogeneity is included (i.e., further exporter types) the four types examined here were 
only just computationally feasible, despite the use of computing resources with high RAM (80 
GB).  From a practical standpoint, this suggests that a regulator might be well served by 
approaching the ultimate threshold level from above in a series of declining steps over time so as 
to approach eventual full usage of inspection resources without generating an unfeasible 
inspection workload.   
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Appendix	
A.  Specification of Historical Interception Rate Dynamics 
A simple but problematic specification for historical interception rate dynamics which 
allows for the contribution of past observations to diminish over time is given by: 
  '( , , ) (1 ) kIa a k I a     ,  (9) 
where  (0,1) determines the relative weight given to the interception rate observed historically 
(a) and currently (k/I).   While appealing in its simplicity, this function has the undesirable 
properties of regressing towards zero automatically if there are no new observations and the most 
recently observed rate of interception (k/I) is given the same weight regardless of the number of 
underlying observations.  An alternative specification can be derived from a Bayesian 
perspective, which overcomes these limitations.  Let ao represent the unobserved true expected 
rate of interception.  Let beliefs about ao be given by a Beta distribution with a mean of µ and 
concentration parameter of c: ao ~ Beta(µ,c).  We replace µ with a since group membership will 
be determined by the expected interception rate, ( )oaE a  .  Updating beliefs using Bayes 
rule given the number of inspections, I, and interceptions, k, results in updated parameters of c* 
= c + I and a* = (ac + k)/(c+I).  This form incorporates no memory loss, i.e. the influence of an 
observation does not diminish with time, only with the total number of observations.  If we 
introduce memory loss in the concentration parameter before it is used in updating, then we have 
c’ = cα + I, with  (0,1).  This has the effect of increasing the spread of beliefs since c’ is 
smaller than it otherwise would be.   Updating of the mean is also affected.  Specifically, 
memory loss (α < 1) leads to a shift in relative weight from historical observations to new:
 
    
     '( , , , ) ac k c k Iac I c I I c Ia a c k I         .   (10) 
This equation is of similar form to the simple version in Equation (9)—a weighted 
combination of a and k/I.  However, the Bayesian form here has two advantages: (1) the relative 
strength of the new information in the ratio k/I is increasing in the number of observations (I), 
and (2)  if there are no observations then there is no change in the historical interception rate: a’ 
= a.  However, this dynamic equation also introduces substantial additional complexity—a 
second variable (c) would need to be tracked by the regulator and would also enter the exporters’ 
decision problem.  To maintain the two advantages listed above but avoid the additional 
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complexity we adopt a simplified version of Equation (10) in which c is fixed. Consolidating the 
two constant terms in to one, cα = ε, results in Equation (1) in the main text.  Here we set c equal 
to the average number of observations for a year (given by the number of annual shipments times 
the likelihood they are inspected) which approximately reflects the level of confidence we would 
have if we focused on observations from just the last year.  Also consistent with the notion of 
emphasizing observations from the last year, we set α such that “old” observations are given a 
weight of 11/12.  Thus we have ε = cα = (36*0.796)*(11/12) = 26.25. 
B. Characterizing Exporter Heterogeneity 
We consider two aspects of exporter heterogeneity: abatement cost and shipment 
frequency. While abatement cost is not directly observed in our empirical data, we observe 
heterogeneity in historical interception rate, which we use to estimate exporter abatement costs. 
Thus, to represent exporter heterogeneity in our model, we categorize exporters (i.e., commodity 
- country combinations) into four groups based on shipment frequency and historical interception 
rates and then use the average of these characteristics for each group to represent four exporter 
“types.”  We then estimate each group’s abatement costs using the calibration approach 
described in the main text. Our approach requires estimating interception rates and shipment 
frequencies for each exporter and grouping exporters based on these characteristics. 
For each exporter with at least one shipment in FY 2012, we calculated the number of 
shipments and proportion of inspected shipments that were found infested using data on 
shipment dispositions (i.e., inspection outcomes) from the AQAS PPQ 280/264 database. 
Shipments were considered intercepted if they were found to have an “actionable pest” as 
indicated by a disposition of "Destroyed Actionable Pest on NARP", "Destroyed-Actionable 
Pest", “Fumigated Actionable Pest on NARP", "Fumigated-Actionable Pest", "Other Action 
Taken-Actionable Pest", or "Returned-Actionable Pest" (USDA-APHIS, personal 
communication). The observed interception rate across all 71,651 inspected shipments in FY 
2012 was 0.0252 (i.e., actionable pests were found in 2.52% of inspected shipments) (Table A1). 
These shipments were sent by 3198 different exporters with an average shipment frequency of 
22.4 per year in FY 2012. 
In our numerical analyses we focus on a subset of exporters for inclusion in the RBI 
policy. This excludes exporters with 2 or fewer shipments in FY 2012.  These extremely low 
frequency exporters are excluded because APHIS intends to always inspect these exporters at the 
maximum intensity, as their low volume of shipments limits learning about their underlying 
infestation rate. This group includes approximately half of all exporters, but less than 3% of 
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shipments (Table A1). In addition, exporters with more than 150 shipments and a historic 
interception rate of less than 1% are excluded since these exporters have already been identified 
as extremely low risk and are subject to less frequent inspections under APHIS’s Propagative 
Materials Release Program.  This includes less than 2% of exporters and 20% of all shipments 
(Table A1). Our analysis focuses on the remaining 55,302 shipments from 1,545 exporters. 
Summary statistics for all exporters are presented in Table A1. 
Table A1. Summary statistics of live plant exports to the US in FY 2012 for all exporters as well 
as groups excluded from and included in the model.  
  
Total 
Exporters 
Total 
Shipments
Average 
Shipment 
Frequency
Average 
Raw 
Interception 
Rate 
Average 
Posterior 
Interception 
Rate 
All exporters  3198  71651  22.4  2.52%  2.50% 
Exporters with > 150 shipments & 
interception rate < 1%  59  14413  244.3  0.10%  0.14% 
Exporters with ≤ 2 shipments  1594  1936  1.2  4.34%  3.32% 
Focal exporters (excluding exporters 
with ≤ 2 shipments and those with > 
150 shipments & interception rate < 
1%) 
1545  55302  35.8  3.09%  3.08% 
Many exporters had far too few shipments in FY 2012 to rigorously estimate their 
interception rate.  For example a sample of five shipments provides a poor estimation of an 
interception rate that likely lies between 0-10%, and almost certainly below 20%.  Thus, to 
estimate the set of exporter interception rates, some with few observations, we use a Bayesian 
approach in which a prior distribution describing beliefs about the true interception rate is 
updated with available observations. Let aj represent the unobserved true probability that a 
shipment from exporter j would be found infested if inspected. This probability is not known 
with certainty.  We characterize beliefs about the value of aj using a Beta distribution,  ~ ,j j ja Beta µ c , where µj = E(aj) is the expected value and cj is the concentration. We use the 
observed average “raw” interception rate across shipments from all exporters in FY 2012 
(2.52%) as the initial value of µj for each exporter.  We select the initial value of the 
concentration parameter to reflect diffuse beliefs with a wide spread, specifically cj = 2.  The 
prior distribution is thus given by (µ0, c0) = (0.0252, 2) for all exporters.  We then update the 
prior for each exporter using their total number of inspections in FY 2012, nj, and total number 
of shipments intercepted, kj. Using Bayes rule, the posterior expected value of exporter j’s 
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interception rate is µ’j = (c0*µ0 + kj)/(c0 + nj). With this approach we assigned each exporter (i.e., 
each commodity– country pair) a historic interception rate estimate, aj = µ’j. 
We divide the focal set of exporters into 4 categories defined by low and high 
interception rates and shipment frequencies.  Average shipment frequency for a type is simply 
the mean number of shipments per exporter in the type.  The average raw interception rate for a 
type is the shipment-weighted mean interception rate across exporters in the type (though note 
that this simplifies to the interception rate for the pool of all shipments within the type). An 
interception rate of a=0.0046 (or 0.46% of inspected shipments found infested) was chosen as 
the cutoff for dividing exporters roughly equally between the low and high interception rate type. 
The cutoffs for dividing exporters into low and high shipment frequency groups were selected so 
that the numbers of exporters were relatively even between groups and the average monthly 
shipment frequency of the low shipment group is an integer (e.g. 1 or 2). We impose this 
constraint because the inspection model operates on a monthly time step and non-integer 
shipping frequencies adds unnecessary complexity.  Monthly shipping rates for high shipment 
rate groups were rounded to the nearest integer.  The resulting shipment frequency cutoffs were 
52 and 85 for the low and high interception rate exporters, respectively. The average shipment 
frequency and interception rates of exporters in each group are used to characterize four 
representative exporters for parameterizing the model. We subsequently estimate a separate 
abatement cost parameter for each group, as we assume that heterogeneity in exporter 
interception rates and underlying infestation rates arises due to differences in abatement costs. 
The four groups of exporters and their interception rate and shipment frequency characteristics 
are shown in Table A2.   
Table A2. Summary statistics for exporters grouped by type. 
Intercept. 
Rate 
Type 
Ship‐
ment 
Freq. 
Type 
Avg. 
Inter‐
cept. 
Rate 
Avg. 
Shipment 
Freq. 
(annual) 
Avg. Ship. 
Freq.,  
(monthly, 
rounded) 
Total Ex‐
porters 
Total 
Ship‐
ments 
% of 
Ship‐
ments 
% of Ex‐
porters 
Low  Low  0.19%  24.0  2  603  14469  26.2  39.0 
Low  High  0.07%  82.8  7  202  16723  30.2  13.1 
High  Low  6.10%  12.0  1  669  7993  14.5  43.3 
High  High  7.31%  227.0  19  71  16117  29.1  4.6 
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C. Additional Results 
In the figures below we present the optimal policy results for the homogenous model. 
Figure A1.  Expected accepted infested shipment rate (per shipment) from homogeneous 
model results given inspection frequency in high group (horizontal axis, ρM) and equilibrium 
targeted shipment share in high group (vertical axis, λ). Numbers in two individual cells indicate 
values for uniform policy (bottom-left) and optimal policy (rightmost). Each colored cell 
corresponds to a feasible policy vector characterized in Figure A2. The left-most column 
represents the uniform policy. 
 
Figure A2. The left image illustrates the set of feasible policy vectors, Ωλ = (M, H, λ), 
considered by the regulator. The right image illustrates each policy’s corresponding interception 
rate cutoff zλ. In both images, white cells represent policies that exceed the budget constraint. 
The left-most column represents the uniform policy. 
 
 
